Projek Dialog

Living in a time of Social Policing

By Yvonne Tan

 

In the wake of the global coronavirus pandemic, several phrases have been repeated as ways to combat the spread of the virus. They include “stay home”/ “duduk rumah”, “wash your hands”/ “cuci tangan” and of course, “social distancing” / “penjarakkan sosial”. However, people all over the world have reacted with panic buying and stockpiling all sorts of non-durable goods in order to “prepare” for self-isolation and lockdowns, in which the easiest reasoning for the consumer phenomena is that pandemics shed light on how panic brings out the worst in people. Although panic buying did not necessarily take off within Malaysia, there is still a salient each-for-their-own behaviour that has materialised.

 

After countless arrests of MCO violators, it goes without saying the pandemic has provided an easy excuse for semi-authoritarian measures by many governments around the world. The Movement Control Order (MCO) refers to the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Order 2020 [PCID Order] under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988 [PCID Act 1988] where the general penalty for a first offence is imprisonment of not more than 2 years or a fine.

 

With the government imposing strict measures, what was most unexpected was the increase in policing by netizens throughout social media, proactively lodging reports against MCO violators. After videos of a preacher and his team who had been aiding the poor during MCO became viral, many parties had lodged police reports against him and hence were questioned by the police. Not to mention on 1 April 2020, the Selangor police spokesman, Ismail Muslim during a press conference stated between 18/3/2020 and 1/4/2020, the Selangor police had received 600 MCO-related reports. In another press conference given on 9 April 2020, 380 more MCO-related reports were received bringing the total to 980. If the numbers were true, there is a surge of reports lodged by the public which begs the question why is there a need to police one another?

 

As social media quickly became a new breeding ground for intolerance and xenophobia, rumours of Zafar Ahmad Abdul Ghani, who heads the Myanmar Ethnic Rohingya Human Rights Organisation Malaysia (Merhrom), had demanded citizenship was subsequently met with immense backlash. This coincided with authorities having denied entry to Rohingyas fleeing the genocide and persecution from the Myanmar government. Change.org had taken down the many online petitions started by the public to expel Rohingyas from Malaysia based on the false claims of their demands, one such petition garnering up to 250,000 signatures.

 

Despite all this, Zafar Ahmad Abdul Ghani denied ever making such a statement and Rohingya groups quickly apologised and distanced themselves from Zafar, urging that Malaysian authorities take action against him.

 

This all comes too convenient as neighbourhoods around Selayang Wholesale Market had tested positive for coronavirus and were quickly blamed amidst anti-Rohingya sentiments. Needless to say, it did not take long for authorities to conduct massive crackdowns on undocumented migrant workers. It is a time where every day we are forced to confront how limited resources are, be it the uncertainty of receiving one’s paycheck, restricted movements outside one’s home or access to goods that could quickly go into shortage overnight. With no vaccine in sight, it’s easy to prop up the disciplinary state when attempting to fully accept the reality of the pandemic. Not to mention, fall back on widely subscribed apocalyptic visions of the world such as fear of Islamic refugees arriving on boats, impending climate disaster, major economic downturn and so on [1].

 

As the nature of coronavirus transmission places responsibility on carriers of the virus who could unknowingly spread it and trigger a domino effect, hence social cooperation and compliance is consistently emphasized. The cause of the virus quickly becomes a game of blaming “irresponsibility” of specific persons, when really it is a luxury that those living paycheck to paycheck cannot afford. It has become a dangerous apolitical idea to blame your neighbour rather than our failing institutions and lack of social security to fall back on in times of need.

 

The reasoning for self-isolation throughout the pandemic was to ease the burden placed on the health system. However, it is important to reframe that the spread of the coronavirus is not completely in one’s hands but one can mitigate it as much as one possibly can. Rather than feeling the need to dominate every aspect of everyone’s life to comply with lockdown orders, we should seek alternatives done during this global pandemic such as Italy’s suspension of mortgage payments during lockdown to Taiwan’s stimulus coupons to encourage citizens to buy commodities to help affected businesses. As Arendt had noted individual isolation and loneliness are preconditions for totalitarian domination, “the “ice-cold reasoning” and the “mighty tentacle” of dialectics which “seizes you as in a vise” appears like a last support in a world where nobody is reliable and nothing can be relied upon.” [2]

 

Although this goes without saying this does not represent all Malaysians as the #KitaJagaKita initiative had also begun and flourished online among others. Hannah Alkaf stated it began with Twitter linking people who want to help with the people who need help. She mentioned “I hope ordinary people – people like us – realise how much of an impact they can make if they simply choose to help someone who needs it. I hope we come to a collective realisation that no society can call itself successful unless we work to raise everyone up, together. I hope we make it through this with kindness and compassion.” And maybe what we need is just that.

 

[1] Žižek, Slavoj. Pandemic! Covid-19 shakes the world. OR Books, 2020, p. 98.

[2] Arendt, Hannah. Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt Brace and Company, 1973, p. 478

 

 

The Revolution is Viral

By Ahmad Fuad Rahmat

Triggered

Now is not the time for the rich to complain about how difficult they have it. That is what Aleeya Zailan and Vivy Yusoff is learning the hard way.

It all began when Aleeya remarked, in obvious reference to Bantuan Perihatin Nasional (BPN), that the B40 will be rich during the Covid crisis while businesses will struggle. The subtext could not have been more offensive. She is implying that the poor are benefitting from the lockdown. Vivy Yusoff, seemingly unbothered by the implication, agrees with Aleeya’s post by saying that this will be bad for everyone.

The posts that sparked the prairie fire. 

It is unfair to make much of offhand comments but that’s exactly what happened. In the ensuing days the two were widely chastised by the internet for disregarding the plight of the poor. Various celebrities (Hairul Azreen and Shaharnaaz Ahmad among them) have spoken in Vivy and Aleeya’s defense but to little avail. The general consensus is to support the poor.

Aleeya’s bumbled justification for what she said saw her mocked even more. But the hate Vivy Yusoff is receiving is particularly venomous. A petition on Change.org calls for her removal from the UiTM board. It received over 6,000 signatories in less than a day. Her quick apology was followed by posts by Fashion Valet offering discounts. But her concession was taken as a sign of weakness as netizens continued to attack her. Everything, from her alleged inability to speak Malay to her expensive Tudungs, became fair game.

Ashraf Ariff weighed in using classic class-war rhetoric: “Alhamdulillah. This coronavirus will eventually reset the wealth gap between the rich and the poor and we won’t have to read nonsense like this anymore”

Meanwhile another class debate brews in the local entertainment industry.

This sparked when a few celebrities were calling for government aid. This is not unwarranted given how generous the BPN is. Malay artistes after all were struggling even before the lockdown. Now with no shows to do or products to promote they are left with no source of income.

But what was rendered as an earnest plea soon generated widespread ridicule. There were the usual charges: Malaysian artistes are out of touch with the masses, they have enough social capital as it is without making this crisis about them etc.

But what does stand out in the chorus of discontent is the assertion that celebrities deserve it because they had been faking their wealth this entire time anyway: It is their fault that they cannot realistically keep up with the lifestyle that had been posing for. Where the Malay masses were willing to play along in celebrity worship before, the crisis has now unmasked all pretensions.

Class is king

Twitter is seeing a populist explosion of class discourse unlike ever before and the fault-line between poor and rich Malays have never been more pronounced.

It is somewhat expected, however, that this would be sparked by media personalities. Malay popular culture – its constellation of films, TV shows, tabloids, influencers and social media-platforms – has always been fruitful grounds for class critique. Plot-lines about migrating to the city, the constant search for work, parodies of the rich have always trailed the slow but certain embourgeoisement of the broader Malay context since Independence. It is obvious in the classics of the Malay cinematic canon as it is in everyday TV dramas and cringey b-rated films.

These narratives generally holds little appeal to the intelligentsia who in their purported refinement turn to Western political theory for their class analysis. But Malay pop culture has the more important effect of being immediate and earnest: The message is that rich people are bad and the ones are who left behind will have the moral victory. It remains loyal to the problem in ways that ‘high-art’ or literature festivals generally have no interest in.

Thus the lesson of the week is that national discourse in the wake of Makcik Kiah and the B40 is clearly providing a much needed corrective to the perception – widely held even by Malay leftists – that ‘Feudal’ Malays are too comfortable with hierarchy. Class resentment – bitter self hatred against their own misfortunes but also more obviously against the Feudal and NEP rich – is mainstream.

B40

What is unprecedented though is that this divide is being articulated in straightforward terms. The class war is between between the B40 and the T20. I doubt there’s much concern as to their statistical particularities and that is beside the point. The ‘divide’ now has been broken down to catchy punchy categories. It’s tweetable, something readily churned by the slightest move of the fingertips.

But more than that they are realistic. Globally, occupy ran with the 99% forgetting that this number came out of American statistics where inequality reached utterly wretched levels. Malay capitalism, which is at best fifty years old give or take, is still in formation and the few who have benefitted from it are rarely so uprooted from their background as to be untouchable. The fate of its commercial class, which is in any case was artificially invented by the state, can be easily thrown into question precisely because its heyday from the late 80s to the mid 90s was only ever short-lived.

That Malay dramas are all too frequently centred on the question of which son will inherit the business speaks to the ever pervasive suspicion that Malay capitalism does not quite have a future. This anxiety, needless to say, is turning out very likely as a swift way out of Covid is looking more improbable by the day.

Anyway, this is why the discourse of inequality in Malaysia, or in this case, among Malays, is often more cultural than economic. Being well-off is about the extent to which you no longer recognise those you leave behind, or how much English you use, or where you studied and how you are rooted to your family etc. Being well off in other words is always stressed as an ephemeral thing, something of recent history, rather than a timeless place.

This is therefore not misplaced grievance because it underscores the basic premise that privilege is not reducible to income. Privilege is how one benefits from a system and for as long as a political system is imbued with culture, culture will also be evoked and deployed when privilege is resisted. Cultural capital goes both ways. People evoke it when it works for them or they use it against others for advantage. The same applies for how ‘culture’ – and this word applies of course too popular ‘low’ culture – is positioned in the Malay case.

Prihatin

But the most interesting development out of this debate is that the B40 are actually speaking out. They are, to use woke parlance, ‘owning’ their label. Rather than to be reduced to a statistical problem (technocrats have only spoken of them as the obstacle to Malaysia’s high income wet dream) they have come out as the privileged segment of the population.

The reason for this of course is none other than Muhyidin Yasin. Whether intentional or not, his speech resonated with the perennial ‘problem demographic’ of Malaysian politics, that is to say, lower income Malay voters. He understood that their challenge is primarily economic.

More importantly he knew how to communicate it. Makcik Kiah as a more effective imagery for class consciousness than AOC.

In this sense the current awakening, however short-lived it may turn out, has an air of authenticity that other attempts to galvanise Malay sentiment before did not. The Red-shirt rallies, Rani Kulup’s many trips to the police stations – they all missed the point. The consensus today stresses that the challenge Malays face is primarily of bread and butter. Religion and race may get them noticed but class consciousness is the prelude to more substantial solidarity. It is no coincidence that the Agung too has agreed to relinquish six months worth of his allowances.

The focus on the B40 as a social category furthermore makes the important point, lost to mainstream political discourse for decades, that not all Malays are struggling. The ire against Vivy Yusof, for all its unfairness, is at least sociologically accurate in this respect.

This to be sure is as much an indictment against Pakatan whose insistence on colour blindness translated to an unwillingness to feature poor Malays in its national vision. They replicate BN’s mistake when they also only speak of Malays as a monolithic category.

This is a strategic point. The Covid crisis occurred in the wake of a takeover by a backdoor government. But the covid crisis is also turning out to be a great leveller. The fact that we must all be confined at home for weeks is making life at a sparsely populated kampung a lot more appealing than a tight overpriced studio in Mont Kiara. Businesses are hurt and the crisis has claimed many elites (A white Prime minister and a Kelantanese Mufti to name just two). Where before only the b40 felt the unfairness of life, now the powerful must too.

Pakatan Harapan will critique the current government for not being liberal enough, dream of making LGE finance minister again and will treat the Rakyat with reruns of the Anwar and Mahathir grudge. But a post-NEP Malay world is being born and unless they too speak to poor Malays, they will not be a part of it.

Backdoor 2020: Some Lessons for Civil Society

By Ahmad Fuad Rahmat

The government’s ‘backdoor’ takeover meant that this follow up to part one had to be wholly re-written. Just as the game has changed so too should civil society’s strategic options.

The question of strategy, in any case, is a good way to begin our consideration of where civil society may have fallen short and what it should reflect on should it want a taste of government again.

No Grassroots Presence

The term ‘grassroots’ is thrown around a lot to become meaningless. However, the re-emergence of the Malay-right presents us with concrete options on how it could be used with political effectiveness, rather than rhetoric, in mind.

In Bahasa ‘Akar Umbi’ does not simply mean ‘the people.’ It evokes, particularly, a certain ordinariness of everyday life, a life that is not secured by privilege or power. The concerns are bread and butter, survival, issues.

Muhyiddin Yassin understood this and made it the immediate focal point of his inaugural speech. By doing so, he establishes a connection with the most significant demographic in Malaysian politics: the Malays who constitute the majority of the B40 population whose support Pakatan Harapan had done everything to lose.

Only time will tell whether his outreach will work but it is a move that makes political sense.

Divisions

The practicality of Muhyidin’s approach stands in marked contrast to civil society’s relationship to the backdoor.

For one, the turn of events were significantly campaigned by the most left-wing elements of PKR who proved themselves upon decades’ worth of civil society work. Some of them are even generally regarded as icons of the Reformasi movement. Hishamuddin Rais’ triumphant admission of presence on that fateful Sheraton night inspired memes but he must be given credit for at least owning the choice, however much it undermines his “non-governmental individual” credentials. We have yet to hear from the rest.

Ambiga’s support for a unity government was similarly met with anger by both sides. Tun was only occupying an interim position and by then was clearly not Pakatan’s choice (the bandwagon at this point of the week was to say that Anwar had commanded the majority). In other words, she was advocating for a candidate whose parliamentary support was unproven, and was at best, doubted.

This wouldn’t be such a problem if we weren’t all about procedural soundness. But aren’t we? Should we be? Who are ‘we’ anyway?

No Malay Support

Many are already mobilizing to get Pakatan back into power. There are countless reasons why this is a better time to take stock and organize than to hit the ground running. But for this entry, I’ll give just one: Anwar and Mahathir have lost Malay support.

This is hard to believe if we only pay attention to the power plays at the party level. But the wave of Malay anger towards Pakatan was consistently building to hit hard, and it did.

One need not be ‘on the ground’ to see this. The by-elections were telling but beyond that the immense popularity of conservative-Malay YouTube channels is already an indication that there is a growing demand for platforms to voice Malay discontent.

The popularity of Minaq Jinggo, Dot Amran, Pertiwi TV, MH Online and Malaysia Gazette, just to name a few, have largely gone unnoticed by urban liberals but the channels indicate a significant mass popularity of conservative Malay discourse. Even PPIM’s YouTube channel, and let’s recall that PPIM is not a media organization, has 141k subscribers.

Before we brush them off as ‘cyber trooping’ or propaganda, as good liberals who are supposed to believe in Freedom of Expression would tend to, we should take some time to notice that these platforms are doing proper critical discourse. They report political news as much as cultural developments. There is the usual demonization of DAP that gets over the top but this is just the counterpart to the over the top ways Siti Kasim or Tajuddin Rasdi talk about Malays.

Get out of the grudge match

There is a more important reason why working to get Pakatan back is not the right way forward for civil society. Our ideological rivals have gone beyond personality politics.

The unlikely alliance that make up Perikatan Nasional is made possible due to a surge in Malay discontent rather than Muhyidin, Zahid Hamidi or Hadi Awang’s charismatic personas.

Perikatan to be sure, can only be a short-term practical arrangement. The enmity between the component parties are real. What they can bet on meanwhile is that Malay voters would rather have them in power than the alternative.

Pakatan’s Mahathir vs Anwar split – and the idea that we should be in the business of rooting for one of them – appears all the more retrograde in this regard. Civil society is already deep in the mire of that longstanding grudge. There is no need to get even more bogged down.

Timing and tact

There are, to be sure, legitimate grievances. We should be angry, and for a long time.

However, there does not appear to be much other than anger. The two rallies were colourful but poorly attended especially in light of the insistence that Pakatan is supposedly the government of the Rakyat.

The poor showing stands out even more given the fact that the gatherings took place over the weekend, the only time street protests are ever viable in this country.

That one of its moments have become a viral parody should indicate that we cannot expect a repeat of May 2019 or Bersih 2.0. Malays have mostly checked out of the Harapan agenda.The political atmosphere has shifted.

This raises the question of whether the cluster of different organizations that make up Malaysian civil society constitutes a ‘community’ in any meaningful sense of the term.

A community, at a very basic level, must agree to certain shared parameters of accountability. Simply put, if I am not accountable for what you are, then we do not really work with the same set of values in mind.

This is hard to determine because the coup has thrown into question a key issue that animated civil society for the past two decades, namely, what Reformasi should be about. This is not an electoral question but one, really, of what ordinary Malaysians can do, a question civil society is supposed to provide answers for.

Now seems like the best time to think of new ones.

Civil society could play a necessary perspective-checking role for the coalition, a way the coalition can look at itself critically from the outside. This is less a matter of principles but tact and diplomacy on our part.

This requires being adept at perspective and tone shifting, which constant earnest moralizing does the least to help.

Joint Collaboration with Bachelor of Social Sciences of Taylor’s University

Recently on the 20th of January 2020, the joint collaboration between Projek Dialog and Bachelor of Social Sciences programme of Taylor’s University was launched.

This 5-year partnership or ‘akad nikah’ as the emcee wittily mentioned, aims to create avenues for work-based learning within its social sciences programmes.

As spoken by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Dr Pradeep Nair, it is believed that private universities have a tendency to shy away from courses that have “less” market value. However, it is important to be steeped in issues surrounding humanity, and the university’s current approach in disrupting the traditional models of education will seek to support social innovation and social change in the country.

This goes hand in hand with Projek Dialog’s objectives, to transgress lines of the status quo in Malaysia such as regimentation and stagnant policy as well as forging fresh partnerships with youths and the creative community. Projek Dialog aims to use the voice of the youth and the messaging of the arts to stimulate better conversations.

This programme will not only help students to become ‘industry-ready’ by the end of their programme, but more than anything, encourage them to graduate from being a marginalised voice to being youth advocates for social change.

 

Civil Society’s Decade in Review (2010-2020): Part 1: Gains

by Ahmad Fuad Rahmat

 

In this series of posts we consider civil society’s gains and challenges in the decade that saw their increased prominence in Malaysian politics. This opening entry provides an overview of its key advances.

 

The BERSIH spark

 

Civil society’s significance is always tied to political urgency. Operasi Lalang galvanized the formation of SUARAM, as Reformasi did for CIJ (Centre for Independent Journalism) and Jalan Telawi. But if one were to think of a turning point that brought civil society to national consciousness it was Bersih 2.0.

 

Its quality as a mass movement meant that its demands were pushed by a broad base rather than a select circle of lawyers and career activists. But more than that Bersih also had the quality of defiance. It went on despite a stern ban by the Home Ministry as hundreds of thousands (some say more than a million strong) sent Kuala Lumpur on lock down, the event memorialized by viral videos of Malaysians of all races confronting the police together.

 

This is all the more impressive when one considers the extent to which the government had tried to stop it. The state-run media played the fears of a possible repeat of May 13th, while accusing Bersih – and later on COMANGO and other affiliated NGOS – of being foreign agents. Clerics were mobilized to make fatwas against demonstrations on a daily basis. The Bersih office was also raided a few days before. The police made an ostentatious press conference displaying (clearly planted) yellow machetes that were allegedly the weapons BERSIH was going to use to unleash havoc.

 

It was all the more troubling that the government’s campaign provoked militant conservatives to confront Ambiga Sreevenesan, the then chair of the BERSIH steering committee, at her own home. The vitriol culminated in an offensive, but also very bizarre, “butt dance” that saw about a dozen or so army veterans bend over to point their hind parts towards her gate. The confrontation didn’t go beyond this, thankfully. Ambiga stayed calm throughout. She offered them water to drink and that was that but this farce of an exhibition did prove the extent to which BERSIH had really struck a chord.

 

A Culture of Discourse

 

BERSIH’s impact, however, is most evident in the discourses that flowered in the aftermath.

 

Forums about the protests spawned other forums about freedom of expression and democracy more broadly. Key is how this forum culture would spread from small student-run DIY salons in Bangsar and Bangi to churches and even to mainstream establishments such as Sinar Harian.

 

KLSCAH, however, was the regular venue for the most passionate and animated discussions (a well known sedition case today had its roots in a rousing speech that took place here in 2013). This, we should keep in mind, was years before RexKL and RUANG. Pusat Rakyat was an arduous walk up a long hill and Art for Grabs was still at Pasar Seni. The less than “edgy” or “polished” spaces then gave the forums an air of accessibility and urgency that is less apparent today especially given the comparatively flatter political climate.

 

The heightened urgency had much to do with the government’s strategy to assert its dominance through religious polarization. Debates on apostasy, the Kalimah Allah ban on the Herald and Shia mass arrests were happening on a daily basis. Nurul Izzah was under fire for allegedly endorsing apostasy for Muslims even when her actual speech was far more qualified than what the news reported.

 

There is a sense then that opinions mattered. Politics was far less guttery and personal and the stakes in political disagreements were high.

 

It was amidst this constellation of circumstances that groups such as Universiti Terbuka Anak Muda, Undi Malaysia, Buku Jalanan, Diskopi, Sekolah Falsafah and Lepak Maqasid, among countless others, grew in appeal and audience. BERSIH and practical politics were not always their immediate interests, and some are no longer active today, but their events did resonate with the heightened political enthusiasm at the time.

 

These, moreover, began as mostly self-funded and self-driven youth-led initiatives. Even Teach for the Needs, which now offers free tuition to underprivileged children, began in 2012 with forums about education as democratic empowerment. A flagship event during their early days featured a weekend-long close reading of Paolo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed.

 

Needless to say, Projek Dialog too grew through this wave of confidence in open democratic discourse.

 

Normalizing protest

 

It is also credit to Bersih’s impact that that the government has since backtracked to take a more tolerant stance towards protests. It was no longer illegal by 2015 for Bersih 4.0.

 

The ultimate moment of validation perhaps was Bersih 5.0 in 2016 when Mahathir Mohamed himself joined the crowd, yellow shirt and cap glaring under the stark afternoon sun, immediately after returning from overseas. Granted, the protest had already lost its transgressive aura by then but this was a milestone given his longstanding position that demonstrations are against Malaysian culture.

 

It is also noteworthy that many protest icons from that time are now in government. Maria Chin Abdullah, Muhammad Sabu and Latheefa Koya are obvious examples. But others like Syed Saddiq, Edry Faizal, Ong Kian Ming and Mazslee Malik also began their journeys as activists who emerged out of those activated years.

 

Perhaps the most valuable gain is that the issues that were championed in 2011 have become mainstream. Today freedom of expression, the flaws in the justice system, the right to different opinions, are even evoked by conservative Malay rights groups.

 

This was unthinkable in 2011-2013 when even the term “NGO” was used by the state run media at the time as a pejorative, when questions on whether human rights is Western or Alien to Islam filled op-eds of the major dailies and packed forums.

 

Ronda Pesta Filem KITA 2020

For the past 2 months, Projek Dialog has embarked on a journey all across Malaysia to bring the people thought-provoking & heart-wrenching short films, along with the opportunity to be filmmakers themselves.

Apart of Pesta Filem Kita (PFK), Projek Dialog’s annual Malaysian film festival, the team along with the esteemed filmmakers from previous film festivals set out to hold roadshows in a total of 7 locations all across the country – Sabah, Terengganu, Semenyih, Perak, Sarawak, Puncak Perdana & last but not least, Johor.

The roadshows each kicked off with a small introduction about Projek Dialog & Pesta Filem Kita, hosted by Victoria Cheng, the festival director of PFK. Explaining how this was the festival’s third year running, she highlighted how Projek Dialog has chosen to step foot outside of KL this year, to reach richer stories from the diverse filmmakers all around the country.

Shining light on the unique & beautiful stories made so far, the roadshow continued with a screening of short films produced by the previous grant winners. The films, each encompassing a face of Malaysian society often hidden, pushed the audience to face the country’s daily uglies, truths & clashes. With films such as Si Tommy, Khilaf, Ninavau & many more, the audience experienced how each filmmaker’s vision was brought to life with the help of Projek Dialog.

The filmmakers, each being a grant winner of PFK, were then able to share their stories with people beyond the buzzing KL metropolis. Despite these seemingly ‘small’ towns, the voices that came together beamed loud with excitement and passion as they discussed & shared their common love for films.

Starting with Sabah in early September, these PFK roadshows witnessed a dedication & curiosity like never before.People from all over the country traveled far and wide to attend these roadshows, some travelling as far from Kuala Lumpur to Terengganu – a tiring but rewarding 4 hour drive.

Some were filmmakers, others film enthusiast, some were just curious, but all who came had a common understanding – that film, as a cultural medium, was one that could speak wonders.

A brief about PFK would follow shortly after, as the festival curator, Muzzamer Rahman, would take the floor. Muzzamer would go on to explain the application conditions & criterias.

There were a few application conditions, such as – only Malaysians age 15 to 35 were eligible to apply, the film duration would have to be 5 to 15 minutes long, etc. Moreover, all submissions had to follow the themes set for the year – Wawason 2020, Minority Voices in Malaysia Baru, Daily Life in Malaysia, Art & Tradition, Cultural/Religious Diversity & Cross-cultural/religious subjects.

Winners of the grants, from West Malaysia and East Malaysia, would be awarded RM 10,000 and RM 13,000 respectively.

As he  spoke to the potential filmmakers in the room, whether it be experienced or amateur filmmakers or simply just Malaysians with ideas, he made clear that PFK was an opportunity to have their story be heard.

Reaching out to Malaysians from different states, cities & towns, the ideas swarming the room were all rooted in a truth that was unique to each individual.

The audience in the room would then get to ask the questions buzzing in their minds, such as questions about PFK, the films or the filmmakers themselves. Hands shot up as the filmmakers & festival curators sat in front of the crowd, ready to answer the audience’s many questions.

Each film brought out a different set of questions from the audience. Whether it be about the plight of the stateless, the act of a Malay boy feeding a dog or child marriages, the audience brought to light their concern for issues of each film, as well as their admiration for each director’s impact of storytelling. There were also thoughts & opinions shared on their perception of the film as audience took the floor to express how they felt along with their critiques of each film, all which the filmmakers accepted with open hearts.

A variety of questions were asked at each roadshow. More than just about the films, there were questions about a filmmaker’s responsibility to their own truth, the answers they hope to provide to society’s qualms, what first steps an aspiring filmmaker can take and many more.

Many continued to go on to speak to the filmmakers & team personally as they shared their views & probed further into the filmmaking experience. Whether it be over a cup of Teh-Ais or outside the classroom door, the conversations between all participants & filmmakers seemed to leave a lasting impact on the audience. Ultimately, each member of the audience was able to leave with a deeper & more diverse perspective of the cultural medium that is film & the power it holds.

As one by one, the audience left the room, they each left with wide smiles, telling us “see you soon!”.

Pesta Filem Kita 3 is approaching (only 5 months away!) & this time, it’ll be sure to draw a crowd like never before.

Zakir Naik and Freedom of Expression: Lessons Beyond Liberalism

by Ahmad Fuad Rahmat

I am not a fan of Zakir Naik. His approach to Islam is intolerant and shallow. His popularity is all the more unearned when we look at the sheer dryness of his rhetoric. Where Malay preachers must at least be humorous or charismatic for mass appeal, Zakir Naik is just simplistic.

This one-dimensionality also explains his widespread appeal. He thrives in providing instant explanations for complicated issues. He simplifies questions of comparative religion into bite-sized and rhetorically arresting responses.

It is a familiar fanaticism: It offers easy and fixed answers for the false comfort of dogma. But it is one that is particularly attuned to the contemporary need for quick truths. He is in this sense evangelical. The richness of tradition is pushed aside for the letter of the law. If there is ever any doubt that modernity and Islam can go together, one has to only look at the Zakir Naik cult of efficiency.

Otherwise there is little of his fanaticism that is interesting. He hasn’t said anything that was not said by Ahmad Deedat, whose books are also widely sold. It is an open secret too that “moderates” like Hamza Yusuf, who English-speaking urban professional-class Muslims welcome with open arms, don’t have the most progressive responses to homosexuality.

The deplorable stances Zakir Naik takes in other words should not shock us when we consider what usually comes with religion in general. There will always be tendencies towards inflexibility.  One need not point to the Zakir Naik fanfare to see this. A quick look at popular titles at the Islamic section of any major book fair is worrying enough.

Zakir Naik is deeply woven into the general fabric of the religious industry. What this means is that there is no way one can call for him to be banned without also triggering the huge market which he is providing his services for. This explains why other influential Malays such as MAZA, Ustaz Azhar Idrus and Syed Saddiq have come to his defense and endorsement.

Liberal dead-ends

And yet many liberals deemed it worthwhile to stir the hornet’s nest in precisely these terms, making it about his popularity rather than his teachings.

This takes the issue to far murkier territory. Censorship is much easier to justify when the intended harm is explicit. The claim that someone or something should be banned because of how he might, could or would influence others is harder to uphold in this digital era where offensive opinions are the norm. Social media also allows us some foresight into how such a position would likely degenerate into debates between differing notions of what should be considered “harmful.”

In a lot of ways this is the ideal of democracy personified. The problem is that we have yet to come to terms with the shrills that comes with the “marketplace of ideas.”

Prohibiting or making police reports against offensive speech on the basis of its possible risks in any case is a conservative purview. Once upon a time liberals used to rail against this logic to argue that art, rap, punk, heavy metal and sexuality should not be censored because a democracy should celebrate free expression even when it is offensive because every individual is inherently endowed with the capacity to decide what is best for themselves.

“But this should not apply to Malays because they are not individuals but an impressionable horde desperate to be led than to think for themselves.” That at least is the subtext in the liberal panic against the spell that Zakir Naik has supposedly cast upon this country.

When a friend earnestly asked why Zakir Naik could be so popular in Kelantan when Malays don’t understand English I spared him my frustration because I knew he was just rehashing the pervasive anti-Malay sentiment that is implied in a lot of the “concerns” about Zakir Naik’s fanaticism.

This friend would have nothing against Malays enjoying Hindi Films or K-Pop of course because this feeds into his ideal of globalized consumerism where open borders should only lead to good feelings. Why exempt Zakir Naik if willing buyer-willing seller is the name of the game? What the liberal cannot fathom is that Zakir Naik is not the dark side of the free market but its very personification. His organic popularity speaks to the pure power of consumer choice against a moralizing state. He is drawing knots around the liberal logic.

Beyond liberalism

The liberal approach is often caught in the double bind between the freedom they vocally claim to uphold on one hand, and the censorship they call for against religious fundamentalists. The good liberal counter to this accusation is to say that free expression should be guarded from those who are against it. Why should fanatics enter the public sphere of rational communication when their beliefs stand against the very principles that structure the conditions of free communication in the first place?

The problem is in the premise. Rationality is a process, not an entity. Similarly democracy is not a place to feel good but a battleground where the possibility of everyone’s freedom could be accommodated. This is a matter of principles of course but also the practice of compromise that has to be built over time.

Expanding freedom of religion and freedom of expression entails confronting difference in the fullest extent of the word. This is not because “diversity is beautiful” but because difference is what we need to work through to construct a robust community.

But our age of identity politics – where liberalism too has been outed as a hardened ideology – has made difference a burden rather than an opportunity. Inclusivity has become harder to imagine and practice. There are no short cuts here for as long as we believe that diversity is worth defending for everyone.

For as long as Zakir Naik remains a popular local attraction, strategic engagement should be prioritized before calling for censorship. Short of confrontation, or appealing to the iron hand of the state, the next best option is the difficult and awkward work of dialogue.

Desentralisasi pilihan terbaik untuk pertumbuhan Malaysia

Penulis: Wing Thye Woo, Universiti Sunway, Universiti California di Davis

Kelas menengah yang semakin berkembang di Malaysia menaruh harapan besar ke atas pembangunan ekonomi negara. Namun negara tidak akan bebas daripada ‘perangkap pendapatan sederharna’ (middle-income trap) dan tidak akan mencapai pertumbuhan yang merangkumi semua lapisan social jikalau terus ditakbir di bawah dasar-dasar kerajaan sekarang. Untuk menggerakkan pembangunan Malaysia ke peringkat selanjutnya, langkah-langkah reformasi yang bakal melahirkan desentralisasi (pemencaran kuasa) dalam pembuatan keputusan perlu diambil untuk membina ekonomi yang diterajui oleh ilmu pengetahuan (knowledge-led economy).  

Kerangka polisi Malaysia kini berakar-umbikan Dasar Ekonomi Baru (DEB) yang diperkenalkan pada tahun 1970 di samping teman sosial-politiknya ‘Ketuanan Melayu’. Dasar Ekonomi Baru telah berjaya membangunkan kelas menengah orang Melayu yang berpengetahuan, berkemahiran dan berkeyakinan terhadap identiti mereka. Akan tetapi, ia juga sudah menjadi pengetahuan umum bahawa kedua-dua dasar yang digubal mengikut keperluan semasa suatu ketika dahulu ini tidak mampu untuk mentransformasi Malaysia menjadi sebuah negara maju.

Untuk mencapai aspirasi-aspirasi ini, reformasi perlu dilakukan dengan segera dalam tiga bidang ekonomi utama. Secara umumnya, setiap bidang ini perlu diperkenalkan suatu komponen reformasi yang sama, iaitu pemantapan secara berhati-hati desentralisasi dalam proses pembuatan keputusan.

Pertama sekali, struktur pentadbiran negara menyekat pembuatan dasar secara inovatif dan menghalang pemantauan yang berkesan. Kerajaan persekutuan berkembang menjadi jauh lebih besar dan lebih kaku daripada kerajaan negeri, dengan kuasa besar yang tidak setimpal.

Belanjawan dan kemampuan berbelanja yang ketara menonjolkan ketidakseimbangan di antara kerajaan persekutuan dan kerajaan negeri. Kerajaan persekutuan berkuasa dari segi undang-undang untuk mengenakan cukai pendapatan dan cukai jualan. Sebaliknya, kerajaan negeri perlu bergantung kepada urusniaga berkaitan dengan tanah dan juga pengutipan cukai ke atas kegiatan kecil-kecilan seperti lesen penjaja untuk memperolehi pendapatan sendiri. Selain itu, kebanyakan perkhidmatan awam dibekalkan melalui cawangan-cawangan kementerian kerajaan perseketuan yang beroperasi di peringkat negeri, dan bukannya agensi kerajaan negeri.

Perbelanjaan negeri adalah ditentukan oleh peruntukan kewangan dari kerajaan perseketuan kepada kerajaan negeri. Padahal jumlah peruntukan turut bergantung kepada pertimbangan politik. Di bawah kerajaan Barisan Nasional (BN), negeri-negeri yang dikuasai oleh pihak pembangkang menerima bajet peruntukan yang jauh lebih kurang daripada negeri-negeri yang dikuasai oleh BN. Kerajaan-kerajaan negeri juga dihalang daripada membuat pinjaman untuk membiayai projek-projek pembangunan. Ini bermakna mereka tidak dapat mencari dana untuk membina prasarana yang diperlukan untuk merentasi leher botol pengeluaran yang dihadapi oleh industri tempatan.

Untuk mencapai pertumbuhan, kerajaan-kerajaan negeri harus diberi kuasa untuk merancang dan melaksanakan strategi-strategi pembangunan masing-masing. Sementara itu, untuk memastikan desentralisasi yang berkesan, setiap kerajaan negeri perlu ada perkhidmatan awam tersendiri dan tidak bergantung kepada kakitangan kerajaan perseketuan. Negeri-negeri juga perlukan peratusan hasil cukai yang lebih tinggi berdasarkan faktor-faktor seperti tahap pembangunan dan sumbangan kepada hasil cukai. Mereka juga patut dibenarkan untuk membuat pinjaman untuk membiayai projek-projek prasarana tempatan – dengan memberikan komitmen bahawa tidak akan meminta penyelamatan kewangan (bailout) daripada kerajaan perseketuan untuk selamatkan projek-projek tersebut – dan juga diberikan tanggungjawab penting yang kini dipegang oleh kementerian-kementerian persekutuan.

Tugas penting kedua ialah membaharukan syarikat-syarikat berkaitan kerajaan (GLCs). GLCs menghimpit ruang sektor swasta dan merosotkan dinamik ekonomi. Selain itu, GLCs juga membolehkan peningkatan gejala rasuah yang seterusnya memburukkan ketidaksamarataan pendapatan.

Secara teorinya, GLCs berupaya mencapai prestasi yang baik, tetapi dari segi praktis, ini tidak berlaku kerana fenomena di mana pegawai-pegawai memperalatkan GLCs demi naungan politik dan rasuah peribadi tidak dapat dielakkan. Sesungguhnya, GLCs adalah makhluk politik, bukan alat ekonomi.

Persaingan di antara GLCs dan swasta bersifat tidak adil dan memudaratkan pertumbuhan secara keseluruhannya. Tidak kira betapa tidak cekap GLCs, mereka sentiasa boleh mengharapkan  penyelematan kewangan oleh kerajaan. GLCs juga menjejaskan dinamik ekonomi apabila mereka membeli pesaing-pesaing mereka yang lebih cekap dalam sector swasta. Lebih teruk lagi, GLCs mencegah pembangunan komuniti perniagaan Melayu yang dinamik apabila usahawan-usahawan Melayu yang berkebolehan ditarik keluar dari keusahawanan swasta untuk mengisi pekerjaan-pekerjaan selesa dan sepanjang hayat dalam GLCs. 

Pengurangan saiz sektor berkaitan kerajaan menerusi penswastaan adalah mustahak demi kecekapan ekonomi, kebertanggungjawapan (akauntabiliti) politik dan kesamarataan pendapatan. Namun, pemilihan pembeli GLCs harus terhad kepada dua pertimbangan sahaja, iaitu saiz tawaran dan peningkatan persaingan dalam industri. Adalah lebih penting untuk menjalankan proses penswastaan secara terancang dan telus daripada secara pantas.

Tugas reformasi ekonomi penting yang ketiga ialah pempelbagaian dan pengembangan saiz sistem perbankan. Struktur monopoli kewangan merosakkan prestasi ekonomi dan memburukkan lagi ketidaksamarataan pendapatan dengan menyekat operasi perusahaan kecil dan sederhana (PKS).

Krisis kewangan Asia yang berlaku pada tahun 1997 telah menyakinkan kerajaan Malaysia bahawa sistem perbankan akan kurang terdedah kepada krisis sekiranya pihak berkuasa dapat memantau bank dengan lebih mudah. Akibatnya, bank-bank yang lebih kecil telah dipaksa untuk bergabung menjadi 10 bank besar pada tahun 2000.

Susuran langkah tersebut, syarikat pelaburan kerajaan muncul menjadi pemegang saham utama dalam kebanyakan bank perdagangan sehingga mewujudkan monopoli sektor perbankan oleh pihak kerajaan. Bank-bank ini bukan sahaja lambat dalam menerima kaedah pembayaran yang lebih baik dan menawarkan produk-produk kewangan baru, namun juga tidak memberikan layanan yang sepatutnya kepada pelangan peniaga kecil, serta bersikap berat-sebelah dan berpihak kepada GLCs dalam hal peminjaman. Ini berlaku kerana bilangan bank yang kecil dan luasnya kawalan kerajaan di kalangan bank-bank terbesar di negara ini.

Satu keburukan parah penggabungan bank adalah PKS Malaysia mula menghadapi kesusahan dalam meminjam modal daripada bank-bank besar, seiras dengan pengalaman  sedunia di manakebanyakan pengusaha-pengusaha kecil dan sederhana mendapatkan modal pelaburan daripada  bank-bank kecil dan sederhana. Tindak balas kerajaan Malaysia ialah menubuhkan Bank Perusahaan Kecil dan Sederhana (Bank SME) milikan kerajaan pada tahun 2005. Akan tetapi Bank SME tersebut tidak dapat memenuhi keperluan modal sektor PKS. Ia juga mempunyai nisbah pinjaman tidak berbayar yang tertinggi dalam industri perbankan. Pertumbuhan lembap sektor PKS menunjukkan bahawa perniagaan baru orang Melayu tidak muncul manakala ketidaksamarataan pendapatan semakin merunsingkan.

Reformasi sektor perbankan bermakna menghidupkan semula bank bersaiz kecil dan sederhana, mengurangkan pemegangan saham kerajaan dalam perbankan, dan selanjutnya menghapuskan sekatan ke atas bank asing dan aktiviti-aktiviti mereka.

Pada dasarnya, DEB ialah ‘Ketuanan Pemusatan Kuasa’ (Supremacy of Centralisation) dalam bidang ekonomi yang berupa-bentuk ‘Ketuanan Kerajaan Persekutuan’ dalam bidang pentadbiran, ‘Ketuanan GLC’ dalam bidang pengeluaran dan ‘Ketuanan Bank Monopoli’ dalam sektor kewangan.

DEB tidak berupaya menggerakkan seluruh kekuatan minda Malaysia demi penciptaan ilmu kerana ia menghalang  kecemerlangan institusi sosial ekonomi daripada diperkasakan dan menyumbang kepada perhijrahan cendekiawan dan modal. Untuk membebaskan Malaysia dari perangkap pendapatan sederhana, ‘Ketuanan Pemusatan Kuasa’ harus disingkirkan daripada kerangka dasar umum untuk memberi jalan kepada pertumbuhan yang diterajui oleh ilmu pengetahuan.

Wing Thye Woo merupakan Presiden Institut Asia-tenggara Jeffrey Cheah dan Pengarah Pusat Pembangunan Mampan Jeffrey Sachs di Universiti Sunway dan Profesor Ekonomi di Universiti California di Davis.

Artikel ini adalah diterjemahkan dari artikel Bahasa Ingeris “Decentralisation the best bet for Malaysia’s growth,” East Asia Forum, 24 Mac 2019; https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/03/24/decentralisation-the-best-bet-for-malaysias-growth/

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